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Abstract  
 
In higher education, personal epistemology is today a significant research area. PE has been seen as 
promising particularly because it focuses on one of the general learning aims of many contemporary 
universities, namely, the development of students’ creative and critical thinking. The article identifies 
serious conceptual problems in the theoretical framework of PE. Firstly, we argue — contrary to many 
promoters of PE — that PE’s theoretical models are not based merely on empirical data from 
developmental psychology, but clearly feature normative philosophical elements. Secondly, we consider 
the acceptance of relativism in the theoretical framework of PE. We argue that the concept of fallibilism 
has been overlooked, which has forced PE theorists to choose between naïve realism and relativism. 
Their choice of relativism has led — in addition to other philosophical problems — to a loss of adequate 
definitions for the epistemological notions of objectivity and certainty. The recognition of 
epistemological fallibilism would be beneficial both to PE’s theoretical framework and to PE-based 
university pedagogy.  
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Introduction 
Personal epistemology (PE) is today a significant field in higher education research. PE examines 
students’ conceptions of knowledge1 from the perspective of developmental psychology.  PE has been 
seen as a promising research area particularly for two reasons: firstly, it focuses on one of the general 
learning aims of many contemporary universities, namely, the development of students’ creative and 
critical thinking (Fisher, 2011; Bok, 2006; Hofer, 2005), which the literature on PE sees as fundamentally 
connected to students’ conceptions of knowledge (Hofer, 2001, 2005; Hofer and Bendixen, 2012; 
Kember, 2001; King and Kitchener, 1994, 2004; Lucas and Tan, 2013; Nieminen et al., 2004; Phan, 
2008). Secondly, PE researchers have provided pedagogical recommendations based on their research 
results (Brownlee, 2004; Hofer, 2001, 2006a; Hofer and Pintrich, 2002; Muis et al., 2006; Perry, 1970; 
Schommer-Aikins and Easter, 2006), and have thus fulfilled the current demand to link research and 
teaching in higher education institutions (Brew, 2003; Brew and Jewell, 2012; Healey, 2005).  
According to Pintrich’s widely used definition, PE refers to ‘an individual’s cognitions about the 
nature of knowledge and the nature of knowing’ (Pintrich 2002: 390). PE’s research tradition has drawn 
heavily from William Perry’s pioneering work in the late 1950s, when Perry began to explore Harvard 
freshmen’s intellectual and ethical development during their college years (see Perry, 1970; Moore, 
2002). On the basis of his research, Perry constructed a model concerning the variety and progression of 
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students’ epistemological and ethical thinking. In Perry’s model, students’ views of knowledge evolve 
from naive egocentrism, absolutism and dualism toward a relativist view of knowledge. According to 
Hofer and Pintrich’s (1997; see also Pintrich, 2002) summary of the contemporary research findings and 
theoretical models of PE, the following four aspects are crucial:  (1) the certainty of knowledge (an 
absolutist versus a relativist view), (2) the simplicity of knowledge (simple and concrete versus complex 
and context-dependent), (3) the source of knowledge (‘from external authorities’ versus ‘from personal 
construction’) and (4) the justification for knowing (criteria for making knowledge claims, use of 
evidence and use of reasoning).  
In this article we focus on the hierarchical models used in PE research and argue that they contain 
fundamental conceptual confusion. This confusion, in our view, is connected to a deeper problem: the 
theoretical framework of PE lacks the notion of epistemological fallibilism. Without fallibilism, PE 
scholars have made a choice between the epistemological positions of naïve realism and relativism. Their 
choice of relativism has led — in addition to other philosophical problems — to a loss of adequate 
definitions for the epistemological notions of objectivity and certainty.  
Although our analysis focuses on one particular theory, our broader aim is to demonstrate the 
importance of philosophical analysis for educational theorizing more generally. As with PE, educational 
theories contain both empirical and philosophical research elements. The relationship between these two 
groups of elements cannot be adequately determined without cooperation between the two types of 
research. Therefore, we think that the arguments presented in this article in relation to PE also have wider 
relevance in educational research.  
 
The philosophical elements of PE  
 
Before we continue to our main argument concerning the philosophical difficulties in the hierarchical 
models2 of PE, we must discuss one potential objection to of our argument. Namely, many promoters of 
PE (e.g. Southerland et al., 2001; Kitchener, 2011) seem to think that their research approach is based 
merely on empirical psychological research and thus has nothing to do with philosophical conceptions 
of knowledge. As Southerland et al. (2001: 333) describe their approach:‘the key to understanding the 
psychological approach to the study of knowledge is that the scientists of human behaviour view 
knowledge and beliefs as psychological constructs (clearly within Popper’s (1972) second world).’ 
And as they elsewhere (2001: 331) describe their interpretation of ‘Popper’s second world’: ‘the second 
is the world of subjective, individual, mental operations (the life of the mind or private consciousness)’. 
Kitchener (2011: 89) makes a distinction between philosophical epistemology and personal 
epistemology when he states that philosophical ‘epistemology is concerned with providing an account 
of the justification condition — of when a belief or action is justified (warranted, appropriate) — 
whereas PE is concerned with determining the actual beliefs held by subjects along (perhaps) with 
causal or genealogical conditions. Justification and related concepts are, at their core, normative 
concepts’. According to him (2011: 84), ‘[i]nsofar as PE research aims to be scientific — something 
most PE researchers would seem to want — it should be committed to the empirical testability of its 
claims. This motif of positivism (or better empiricism) is a legacy we should retain as an essential part 
of an adequate epistemology for PE research’. Later Kitchener (2011: 85) states that ‘it [philosophical 
epistemology] could construct a completely philosophical theory of knowledge with no (or little) 
dependence on any scientific fact. It would follow therefore that a study of PE and the correlative 
concept of a PE would be different from this philosophical epistemology’.  
However, some scholars in the tradition of PE seem to think differently, and have endeavoured to 
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analyse the relationship between psychological and philosophical epistemology in PE’s theoretical 
constructions (e.g. Greene et al., 2008, 2010; Muis, 2004; Muis et al., 2006; Murphy, 2003; Murphy et 
al., 2012).   Murphy et al. (2012) have recently argued that a deeper understanding of the nature and 
conditions of knowledge is needed in PE theory. Elsewhere, Buckland (2010) and Chinn et al. (2011) 
have pointed out that the prevailing research on PE insufficiently engages philosophy. We share this 
view that the philosophical analysis of PE is not yet sufficient: there are serious philosophical problems 
in the background assumptions of PE which may result in problematic educational guidelines and in a 
distortion of researchers’ interpretations of empirical data. 
We of course agree with Kitchener and many others that the philosophical and empirical analyses 
of knowledge differ fundamentally from each other; indeed, were it true that the theoretical models of 
PE would merely categorize and organize empirical data, the whole idea that PE is in need of further 
philosophical research would be pointless. Namely, the philosophical analysis of knowledge focuses on 
the adequate definition and justification of knowledge as a theoretical concept, whereas the empirical 
analysis of knowledge is interested in how human beings actually see and understand the nature of 
knowledge and how knowledge is constituted and acquired by human beings.3 The distinction between 
normativity (how things ought to be) and descriptivity (how things are) is important here. In the language 
of philosophy, one commits the naturalist fallacy if one deduces ‘ought’ from ‘is’ or vice versa.  On the 
basis of a philosophical analysis, one cannot say how things are in the real world, and on the basis of an 
empirical analysis one cannot say how things ought to be. Therefore, when one is interested in 
understanding what the most adequate conception of knowledge is, one should consult philosophical 
research; conversely, when one is interested in what people actually think about knowledge and how they 
construct their systems of belief, one should consult empirical research.  
It follows that on the basis of empirical research, one can derive no conclusions concerning the 
superiority of one conception of knowledge over another. To the extent that the theoretical models of PE 
do this, they involve a normative dimension. Furthermore, in not recognizing the normative nature of 
some parts of the theory — and in interpreting them as descriptive — they commit the naturalist fallacy. 
The following three examples demonstrate that PE’s theoretical models include normative elements.    
Firstly, PE’s theoretical models entail claims of the superiority of some conceptions of knowledge 
over others. These models are clearly hierarchical, because they hold that some epistemological positions 
are more ‘sophisticated’ or ‘higher’ than others (Kaartinen-Koutaniemi and Lindblom-Ylänne, 2012: 2; 
King and Kitchener, 1994, 2004; Kuhn, 1999, 2005; Perry, 1970; West, 2004). In Paul Pintrich’s (2002: 
400) words: ‘there is fairly high agreement on the nature of developmental change. Again, at some level, 
all the models represented in this volume are in line with the proposition that an individual’s thinking 
about epistemological issues not only changes over time, but that it develops toward a more sophisticated 
perspective or stance toward knowledge and knowing’. This is to say that the theories maintain that there 
are differences in the adequacy and justifiability of students’ personal conceptions of knowledge and that 
PE’s hierarchical models manifest this order of superiority.   
Secondly, PE researchers have provided multifarious educational recommendations based on their 
empirical findings (e.g. Brownlee et al., 2009; Hofer 2001, 2006b; Lahtinen and Pehkonen, 2013; Muis 
et al., 2006; Perry, 1970). As an example, Brownlee et al. (2009: 612) write: ‘[e]ssentially, we are 
advocating for pedagogy in higher education that is informed by personal epistemology rather than the 
implementation of particular teaching strategies per se. This new pedagogy requires a culture change in 
learning (Baxter Magolda and Terenzini, 2004); one that engages us all in a more sophisticated way of 
knowing and learning in higher education’.4 
Thirdly, PE scholars appear to assume that change in students’ conceptions of knowledge can be 
unproblematically interpreted as development from lower (less adequate) to higher (more adequate) 
conceptions.5 However, there is always the possibility of some kind of adaptation instead of genuine 
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development. It is possible, for example, that students have learned from their teachers what would be 
the most adequate way to think about knowledge, and have adopted this view regardless of its real 
epistemological benefits.6 
These three examples demonstrate that there are normative elements in the theory of PE. This is 
not a problem as such, but rather a necessary characteristic of a model constructed in a research approach 
which aims to both gain knowledge from students’ actual conceptions and provide pedagogical 
recommendations for developing these conceptions. However, the theoretical model constructed within 
a research field of this nature needs an understanding of students’ actual conceptions as well as the 
normative standards of knowledge; otherwise it clearly commits the naturalist fallacy of deducing ‘ought’ 
from ‘is’. In other words, this kind of theory including both descriptive and normative elements must 
consult both types of research, empirical and philosophical alike. 
The distinction between descriptivity and normativity also implies that the present article as a 
philosophical analysis is not, in the first place, criticizing the empirical findings of PE. For example, on 
the basis of empirical research it can be true that students’ conceptions of knowledge develop toward 
relativism. Our point is that even if this was empirically true, it would not imply that relativism is an 
epistemologically justified position. In addition, it is also possible that the theoretical models used in 
interpreting empirical data have distorted the research findings. Recent empirical findings actually 
indicate that empirical data cannot be properly interpreted using the current PE models, because these 
models do not capture the variation of students’ epistemic positions (Hyytinen et al., 2014). For example, 
all students in the present small-scale qualitative study were found to share a fallibilist view of 
knowledge, whereas previous research on PE has not identified students who are committed to 
epistemological fallibilism. Indeed, this would have been difficult or even impossible because the 
concept of fallibilism is not included in the theoretical framework of PE.  
In the following two sections we will first analyse in more detail the philosophical component of 
PE theory. We will argue that in its embrace of epistemological relativism and in its naïve interpretation 
of realism PE theory ends up in serious conceptual confusion. Second, we will suggest that fallibilism 
— the epistemological position missing from PE literature — would be useful in order to avoid the 
conceptual problems of the current theory.       
PE’s Untenable Normative Epistemology  
 
The idea of relativism as a sophisticated – or in some versions the most developed — epistemological 
position that one can acquire is shared among PE’s theoretical variants as well as among researchers’ 
interpretations of empirical data (Briell et al., 2013; Hofer and Pintrich, 1997; Hofer, 2000, 2002, 2005, 
2006b; Kember, 2001; Perry, 1970).  
The pioneering theory endorsing relativism is from Perry (1970: 109–111), who describes a 
revolutionary step in students’ thinking in which their worldview becomes entirely relativistic. Perry 
(1970: 111) describes this level of personal epistemology as follows:  
  
Relativism is perceived as the common characteristic of all thought, all knowing, all of man’s 
relation to his world. Against this ground, dualistic right-or-wrong thinking, and even “ideas of 
absolutes” becomes special cases in the new relativistically structured context.  
 
Although the mainstream literature of PE endorses relativism, some scholars within the tradition 
have questioned the idea of relativism as a sophisticated view of knowledge (e.g. Schommer-Aikins, 
2002; Kuhn, 2005; Kitchener, 2011). Perry’s adherence to relativism, and its criticism, have been 
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discussed for example by Moore (2002). However, the various philosophical critiques of relativism and 
the positive solution of including fallibilism within the theoretical framework of PE — the main points 
of this article — have not been considered in any depth. 
Furthermore, the discussion on the potential problems of relativism has had little effect on the 
endorsement of relativism in PE’s pedagogical recommendations. In Hofer’s (2006b: 74; see also 2001) 
words, ‘based on Perry’s developmental scheme, faculty members have been advised for several decades 
to help students move from their black-and-white thinking toward a more relativist stance’. Elsewhere, 
Hofer and Bendixen (2012: 246) write that ‘[b]eginning with Perry (1970), epistemology researchers 
have asserted that education should equip students to advance beyond absolutist thinking and learn to 
make reasoned choices within the relativism that exists in society’. Lahtinen and Pehkonen (2013: 397) 
report that according to their research, students’ ‘epistemological beliefs changed over a period of time 
from absolutism toward relativism and that the pedagogical environment played an important role in this 
process’.7 David Kember (2001: 217) even declares that ‘critical and creative thinking is only possible 
if relativism is recognised’. 
 Deanna Kuhn later developed the idea of ‘evaluativism’ as the most developed epistemological 
position. In pointing to the possibility of evaluating knowledge in the light of reasons and evidence, this 
idea has similarities with the epistemological fallibilism defended in our argument. However, in Kuhn’s 
model as well, relativism (what Kuhn has lately termed “multiplist”) is seen as the second-best 
epistemological position, and the necessary level through which one can develop toward evaluativism 
(e.g. Kuhn, 2005; Kuhn and Weinstock, 2002; Kuhn et al., 2000; Hofer, 2006a; see also Hofer & 
Bendixen, 2012). According to Kuhn et al. (2000, 310):   
 
In what we take to be a key event in the development of epistemological thought, the multiplist   
relocates the source of knowledge from the known object to the knowing subject, hence becoming 
aware of the uncertain, subjective nature of knowing. This awareness comes to assume such 
proportions, however, that it overpowers and obliterates any objective standard that could serve as 
a basis for comparison or evaluation of conflicting claims. Because claims are subjective opinions 
freely chosen by their holders and everyone has a right to their opinion, all opinions are equally 
right. 
 
It seems obvious that most PE scholars are not familiar with the philosophical discussion of 
relativism. PE’s literature neither presents philosophical arguments defending relativism nor refers to the 
arguments presented by philosophers of knowledge. This is surprising, particularly because the 
philosophical critiques of relativism are manifold. 
Firstly, many philosophers have pointed out that absurd conclusions follow from the relativist idea 
of humans as constructing the facts (e.g. Boghossian, 2006: 38–39; Scheffler, 2000, 2001). From this 
position of constructivism to which many PE scholars (e.g. Hofer and Pintrich, 1997; King and Kitchener, 
2004; Kuhn, 2005; Valanides and Angeli, 2005) subscribe, follows, for example, that the world 
approached by natural sciences can exist only when there are humans to perceive and conceptualize it. 
Israel Scheffler (1997: 199–200) characterizes the core of this philosophical problem as follows:  
  
Now, whether a world answers to a version of our making is, in general, not up to us. Thus, if an 
“actual world” answers to a version of our making, we can hardly be supposed to have made it do 
so. Moreover, if a version of our making turns out to be true, it hardly follows that we have made 
its objects. Neither Pasteur nor his version of the germ theory made the bacteria he postulated, 
nor was Neptune created by Adams and Leverrier or by their prescient computations. 
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Secondly, a crucial philosophical question that relativists have difficulty answering is, as 
Boghossian (2006: 39) puts it, ‘the problem of disagreement’. Namely, within the relativist framework, 
no belief can be seen as incorrect. In Boghossian’s (2006: 39) words:  
If a given fact really does owe its existence to our intentional activities, it is hard to see how there 
could fail to be possible circumstances in which we might have chosen to construct a different fact 
incompatible with it.   
Thirdly, perhaps the most fundamental problem of relativism is that it is a self-refuting position. As 
Harvey Siegel (1987: 8–9) explains: 
the relativist must appeal to non-relativist criteria, and assert relativism non-relativistically, in order 
to make the case for relativism. This is self-defeating for the relativist. But to fail to assert and 
defend relativism in this (non-relativistic) way is to fail to join the issue with the non-relativist who 
asserts that relativism is false (or incoherent). So the relativist can defend relativism only by 
rendering it incoherent. Conversely, to defend relativism relativistically is to fail to defend it at all. 
For if relativism is right, the very notion of rightness, and indeed that of rational defense, is given 
up, and so it cannot coherently be claimed that relativism is right or rationally defensible. In short: 
to defend relativism is to defend it non-relativistically, which is to give it up; to ‘defend’ it 
relativistically is not to defend it at all.  
 
In a similar vein, Boghossian (2006: 56) writes that ‘either the formulation [the relativist] offers us does 
not succeed in expressing the view that there are only relative facts; or it consists in the claim that we 
should so reinterpret our utterances that they express infinitary propositions that we can neither express 
nor understand’. 
If we now consider in more detail the different interpretations of ‘relativism’ among scholars of 
PE, it appears that all do not entail relativism in its self-refuting form. Some hold that relativism is a view 
which understands knowledge as ‘contingent and contextual’ (Hofer, 2000: 379; see also Briell et al., 
2013: 482), whereas others see relativism as referring to the idea that ‘everyone has a right to his or her 
opinion, all opinions are equally right’ (Kuhn and Weinstock 2002: 123; see also Hofer, 2005). These 
interpretations of relativism differ so fundamentally from each other that some can be interpreted as not 
being (epistemologically) relativistic at all, whereas others cannot be interpreted otherwise.  
Therefore it is important to distinguish between three positions all labelled relativistic in the context 
of PE: (1) knowledge is context-dependent in a weak sense, (2) knowledge is context-dependent in a 
strong sense, and (3) all beliefs are equally right. The first position states that particular human beliefs, 
statements and theories can be understood only in relation to some context, and cannot be directly 
compared, say, with the facts of independent reality. This position does not necessitate relativism, but 
actually fits better with epistemological fallibilism. With the second position, beliefs, statements and 
theories can be evaluated only in relation to some context, outside of which nothing can be said of their 
credibility and justifiability. This position is a version of (modest) relativism. Finally, the position that 
all opinions are equally right is, of course, a version of relativism in its ultimate form.  
As mentioned above, the essential problem of this ultimate form of relativism is that one cannot be 
incorrect, because relativism admits no criteria for evaluating beliefs and theories. The same problem 
arises in contextual relativism once we become interested in justifying our beliefs outside a clearly 
defined context. Another problem of contextual relativism is the question of how we can define the 
contexts in which we are justified in saying that some belief is incorrect.  
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This problem is worth noting in relation to Kember’s (2001: 217) aforementioned connection of 
relativism with the possibility of critical thinking.8 Along the lines of the previous argument, within the 
framework of epistemological relativism critical thinking is altogether pointless. If all beliefs and 
opinions are equally right, why should one think critically? In contrast, if Kember had said – along the 
lines of fallibilism — that all opinions, beliefs, and theories are fallible and should thus be submitted to 
critical thinking, this position would not cohere with relativism but rather with fallibilism.  
Another problem following from relativism is that PE theory cannot effectively distinguish 
between the epistemological notions of objectivity and certainty. Indeed, in PE literature these notions 
are lumped together and connected with the naïve version of realism. According to Kuhn and Weinstock 
(2002: 123), ‘someone at the absolutist (as well as the pre-absolutist realist) level sees knowledge in 
largely objective terms, as located in the external world and knowable with certainty’. 
Or, as Kuhn (2005: 30−31) describes the realist level of personal epistemology: 
 
Beliefs are faithful copies of reality. They are received directly from the external world, rather than 
constructed by the knower. Hence, there are no inaccurate renderings of events, nor any possibility 
of conflicting beliefs, because everyone perceives the same external reality. 
 
However, the possibility of objectivity implies neither the possibility of certainty nor the idea that 
our beliefs are direct copies of external reality. Contrary to the absolute nature of certainty, objectivity is 
best understood as a matter of degree. Our descriptions of reality can be more or less objective, depending 
on the adequate use of evidence and good reasons. At one end of the continuum are the merely subjective 
beliefs and at the other, the beliefs based on all relevant evidence and reasons (e.g. Holma, 2011: 536). 
The theories of science, for example, aim to reach the highest level of objectivity. But even a theory that 
had done so could never be assumed to be certain.  
Relativism is an epistemological position not easy to defend. Were it not difficult in general, it 
would be untenable in the context of PE, because many of the aims and assumptions of PE are in 
contradiction with relativism. The endorsement of critical thinking as a learning aim, which is one of the 
main interests of PE (e.g. Kember, 2001; King and Kitchener, 2004; Kuhn, 2005, Lucas and Tan, 2013; 
Phan, 2008), is pointless within the relativist framework9. The learning aim of critical thinking is 
conceptually connected to the epistemological ideal of rationality (cf. Scheffler, 1973; Siegel, 1997). 
Rationality – as well as its development through teaching – requires the possibility of having some criteria 
for evaluating beliefs, conceptions and theories. Furthermore, epistemological relativism undermines the 
very possibility of teaching because if all beliefs and conceptions are equally valid, teachers have no 
criteria to assess students’ understanding and develop teaching. Moreover, the idea of research-based 
teaching, to which PE research aims to contribute at both theoretical and practical levels, relies on the 
idea that there are (scientific) criteria for determining teaching methods that work, as opposed to other 
methods. If, in contrast, researchers’ beliefs regarding teaching methods were only relative to their own 
subjective constructions, cultures, or other contexts, universities would not be justified in promoting or 
advancing research-based teaching.10  
Fallibilism as an epistemologically justified alternative 
 
One reason for the endorsement of relativism may be that PE theory does not involve the conception of 
epistemological fallibilism. Without fallibilism, PE theorists see the only alternative to relativism being 
some kind of naïve version of realism and epistemological foundationalism. This is to say that their 
interpretation of realism understands human beliefs as direct copies of reality (e.g. Kuhn, 2005: 30; Kuhn 
Final draft 
8 
 
and Weinstock, 2002: 124), and their interpretation of absolutism (which should rather be termed 
foundationalism) sees that humans can achieve certainty (e.g. Kuhn and Weinstock, 2002; Kuhn et al., 
2000). One can agree that in comparison with these views of realism and absolutism, relativism may 
indeed seem a sophisticated epistemological position. 
However, naïve realism and epistemological foundationalism are by no means the only alternatives 
to relativism. To the contrary, contemporary epistemology offers many routes for avoiding relativism 
without committing to either naïve realism or epistemological foundationalism. For example, although 
many contemporary philosophers defend various versions of realism (Niiniluoto, 1999), none of them 
accept that human beliefs are direct copies of reality, or that human beliefs could be certain. Realism, as 
such, states only that reality exists independently of humans. Realists may differ with respect to what 
part of reality they hold as existing independently of humans, and the extent to which they think that 
reliable knowledge can be acquired, but their assumption of the existence of independent reality makes 
them all philosophical realists. Realism implies neither the idea of the certainty of human knowledge nor 
the idea that human conceptions could directly reflect reality (e.g. Scheffler, 2000, 2001; see also Holma, 
2004, 2009). Realists are usually committed to the idea that all knowledge is fallible. 
Furthermore, Harvey Siegel (1987: 9–10) argues in his Relativism Refuted that an absolutist view 
of knowledge, in the sense that ‘claims to knowledge can be fairly, non-question-beggingly assessed’, 
does not imply that knowledge requires an indubitable foundation. In his discussion of Harold I. Brown’s 
defence of relativism, Siegel argues that Brown actually conflates relativism with fallibilism, and 
absolutism with foundationalism.  
According to Siegel (1987: 9–10), the epistemological benefits Brown identifies with relativism 
are more suitable to fallibilism. For example, Brown’s statement ‘[t]he main thesis of relativist 
epistemology is that knowledge can be constructed on a fallible foundation. Relativism affirms my right 
to hold my own presuppositions in spite of their fallibility, to proceed on the basis of these 
presuppositions, and to reject competing presuppositions as false (Brown, 1977, 550)’ is, in Siegel’s 
view, not true of relativism but rather fallibilism. Within a relativist framework one actually cannot 
justifiably reject any competing presuppositions as false. 
In our view, the theoretical framework of PE as well as its pedagogical recommendations would 
benefit by including fallibilism in its epistemological conceptions. Fallibilism preserves the benefits PE 
identifies with relativism without slipping into a self-refuting form of relativism or into conceptual 
problems in terms of objectivity.  
Fallibilist11 epistemology originates from Charles Sanders Peirce’s philosophy, in particular two 
articles (Peirce, 1934a, 1934b), ‘Some consequences of four incapacities’ and ‘Questions concerning 
certain faculties claimed for man’. Peirce formulated the concept of fallibilism to counter the two 
prevailing epistemological traditions of his day: rationalism and empiricism. He stated that both of these 
traditions fail in their assumptions regarding the possibility of certainty: rationalism in basing the 
possibility of certainty on reason, and empiricism in connecting certainty to perception. Peirce, who was 
impressed by Darwin’s groundbreaking theory, argued that due to the evolutionary origin of human 
knowledge there can be no certainty. Consequently, there are no fixed starting points from which we 
could derive infallible knowledge. 
This line of thought did not, however, lead Peirce to skepticism regarding human knowledge. 
Instead, he argued that while certainty is not possible, there are good reasons for taking our current 
conceptions as a starting point for action and further inquiry. In Peirce’s view, the Cartesian concept of 
systematic doubt is self-deception, not something real human beings can achieve. We have to begin our 
thinking, doubting and criticizing from where we are. This position, like the belief that all human 
knowledge is uncertain, coheres with the evolutionary understanding of knowledge: the bodies of 
knowledge we now have may be mistaken, and are thus possibly subject to revision, but they have, 
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nevertheless, survived the process of evolution to this point; as such, they provide the best available 
starting point for how to proceed at the present moment with respect to further inquiry.  
Fallibilism is thus different both from variants of relativism which claim that it is not possible to 
evaluate, compare, and improve our conceptions, and from variants of foundationalism, which claim that 
some sources of certainty or fixed starting points exist upon which to base our search for understanding. 
Fallibilism differs from relativism in not taking all beliefs, conceptions or theories as being either equally 
right or right merely in relation to some context, but seeks the criteria for evaluating, comparing and 
justifying our beliefs, theories and conceptions. 
For PE, the recognition of fallibilism may have two different kinds of implications, some related 
to research and others to pedagogical recommendations. As we have argued, pedagogical 
recommendations cannot directly follow from empirical research due to the normative nature of 
pedagogy. Our argument also applies, of course, to the notion of fallibilism: to find fallibilist features in 
empirical data is one thing, to recommend fostering fallibilism through teaching is another.   
At the level of empirical research, the research framework can be refined in a way that enables the 
identification of fallibilist features in students’ epistemological positions (see also Hyytinen et al., 2014). 
The framework which identifies fallibilism can also expand researchers’ understandings of individuals’ 
epistemic development. At the level of pedagogical recommendations, fallibilism can be seen as a 
responsible epistemic position, because it admits to the uncertainty of knowledge but does not end up 
with the relativist conclusion that all beliefs are equally valid. A fallibilist view of knowledge, as the 
epistemic position held by many philosophers of science as the basis of all scientific activity, would be 
worth promoting in university studies. Fallibilism, by accepting the uncertainty of all human knowledge, 
can also be seen as a psychologically mature view of knowledge. As PE scholars King and Kitchener 
(2004: 9) themselves write, and in a clearly fallibilist spirit:  
 
Reflective thinkers consistently and comfortably use evidence and reason in support of their 
judgements. They argue that knowledge claims must be understood in relation to the 
context in which they were generated, but that they can be evaluated for their coherence and 
consistency with available information. Because new data or new perspectives may emerge as 
knowledge is constructed and reconstructed, individuals using assumptions of reflective thinking 
remain open to reevaluating their conclusion and knowledge claims. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article we demonstrated the importance of an effective distinction between normative and 
descriptive dimensions of the theoretical framework used in the research area of personal epistemology. 
We particularly focused on the implicit normative assumptions within the theoretical framework of PE. 
Of special interest to us has been the problematic pedagogical recommendations that follow from such 
assumptions. Furthermore, we demonstrated how philosophical research could contribute to the 
normative dimensions of this theory, particularly by revealing some of the theory’s conceptual confusion 
and contradictory assumptions in its current form. Finally, we introduced the notion of fallibilism as a 
way out. In our view, similarly with PE, other educationally oriented research would benefit from a 
dialogue between philosophical and empirical research. 
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Notes 
1PE literature contains numerous synonyms for the term personal epistemology, such as epistemic 
cognition, epistemic thinking, epistemological understanding, reflective judgement, epistemological 
beliefs, epistemological assumptions, and ways of knowing. Harvey Siegel has recently criticized some 
of the current uses of the term ‘epistemology’ in science education, and has emphasized that 
‘“epistemology” is the name of that branch of philosophy dedicated to the theory of 
knowledge’ (Siegel, 2014: 372). 
2 PE literature features several variants of the hierarchical models of personal epistemology (e.g. Baxter 
Magolda, 1992; Hofer and Pintrich, 1997; King and Kitchener, 1994, 2004; Kuhn, 1999, 2005; Perry, 
1970). All of these models are similar in relation to the features discussed in this article (see also Hofer, 
2002: 379).   
3This of course does not imply that either of these research areas can provide any certain or final answers, 
but merely that they are devoted to approaching these particular questions and are thus likely to have the 
best available answers to their core questions.  
4PE scholars also promote the idea of a research-based understanding of learning and teaching as a basis 
of higher education (Brew and Jewell, 2012; Brew, 2003; Stes et al, 2010). However, a small number of 
studies have explored how pedagogical practices affect the development of students’ conceptions. 
Moreover, there are no groundbreaking results showing relationships between teaching practices and 
students’ development (Lahtinen and Pehkonen, 2013; Lidar et al., 2004; Louca et al., 2004; Valanides 
and Angeli, 2005). Research has mostly concentrated on students’ conceptions as such (i.e. Briell et al., 
2013; Brownlee, 2004; Kienhues et al., 2008; King and Kitchener, 2004; Kuhn and Weinstock, 2002; 
Rodríguesz and Cano, 2006; Schommer-Aikins and Easter, 2006). Therefore, most research-based 
pedagogical recommendations are not based on research concerning the effectiveness of pedagogical 
interventions, but rather on researchers’ opinions concerning the best ways to support, enhance and 
improve the development found in empirical research concerning students’ learning processes.  
5This assumption can be seen as quite reasonable in Deanne Kuhn’s model, which conceptualizes the 
progression of ways of thinking from early childhood to early adulthood. However, even though 
development in childhood can, in most cases, be interpreted as development from limited to more 
comprehensive understanding, this assumption can be genuinely distortive when applied to adult 
learners. 
6The same dilemma is recognised in the research on students’ critical reflection (see Mälkki and 
Lindblom-Ylänne, 2012). 
7Emphasis added. 
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8 On the promotion of critical thinking as a learning aim in the tradition of PE, see also King and 
Kitchener (2004), Kuhn (2005), Lucas and Tan (2013) and Phan (2008).  
9The problems of relativism in the educational context have been discussed, for example, by Kotzee 
(2010), Matthews (2000) and Phillips (1995).  
10Another, independent question is whether this aim is reasonable even if anti-relativism is accepted. One 
can be anti-relativist and either positive or sceptical about the possibility of research-based teaching. Our 
point is instead that this discussion is only possible among anti-relativists.  
11This summary of Peirce’s thinking is based on Holma’s interpretation of the following works: Charles 
Sanders Peirce, Pragmatism and Pragmaticism, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1934, Christopher Hookway, Peirce, 1985; Max H. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic and Pragmatism, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986, and Israel Scheffler, Four Pragmatists, London: 
Routledge, 1974, see also Holma, 2012: 397–400. 
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